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ABSTRACT
We employ the quality of governance to study the impact of
local institutional context on foreign subsidiaries’ performance.
We propose and empirically document that local institutional
quality has growth-enhancing effects on subsidiary growth.
More specifically, we show that political stability, government
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of low are positively
and significantly related to subsidiaries’ output. Our findings
suggest that, apart from resources and market considerations,
institutional constructs should be included as influential pre-
dictors in the general models investigating subsidiary
performance.
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Over the last decades, a number of studies have gradually focused on sub-
sidiaries as a distinctive field of investigation within the broad areas of
international management strategy, and international business research (e.g.
Paterson and Brock 2002; Rugman and Verbeke 2001). Within this litera-
ture, the study of foreign subsidiary performance is one of the most funda-
mental and much-debated issues among scholars, and practitioners alike
(e.g. Birkinshaw, Hood, and Young 2005; Kafouros and Aliyev 2016).
Traditionally, the majority of the work in the field was mainly anchored
either on the premises of the market-based (MBV) (Porter 1980), or
resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984).
According to the former, firm performance depends upon the structural
conditions of the industry in which the subsidiary operates, such as the
extent of rivalry among competing firms (Christmann, Day, and Yip 1999),
the size of the market, and the availability of suppliers (Birkinshaw, Hood,
and Young 2005). In an opposite direction, RBV has adopted a firm-
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internal perspective, positing that subsidiary performance is contingent
upon the successful exploitation of intangible assets and capabilities in for-
eign markets, such as technology and innovation, knowledgech, informa-
tion, intellectual property, technical, and human expertise (Fang et al. 2007;
Fey and Bjorkman 2001; Hughes et al. 2017). These resource-based advan-
tages usually stem from the parent organization, with the overall purpose
to secure the competitive position of their geographically dispersed subunits
(Mellahi et al. 2013). Subsidiaries have access and exploit different types of
resources and, therefore, perform differently in their marketplaces
(Andersson, Forsgren, and Holm 2001).
Notwithstanding their important insights in explaining performance
determinants, MBV overemphasized the importance of industry structure,
leaving the inside of the firm to act as a “black box”, while the RBV has
not looked beyond the properties and characteristics of resources, neglect-
ing in that way the role of external factors in organizational growth
(Manolopoulos, Chatzopoulou, and Kottaridi 2018). More importantly,
both theories have been criticized for not considering the relative import-
ance of country effects, such as local institutions, in determining subsidiary
performance. However, different country conditions and different types of
relationships with local institutions influence both industry structure and
the way multinational enterprises (MNEs) leverage their resources in inter-
national markets (Birkinshaw, Hood, and Young 2005). Thus, the institu-
tional context of a country may act as a catalyst on subsidiary performance
(Konara and Shirodkar 2018; Spencer and Gomez 2011).
Grounded upon these developments, institutional perspectives filled the
MBV and RBV voids, gaining increasing recognition in explaining MNEs
competitive and performance dynamics in the international market space
(e.g. Goldszmidt, Brito, and de Vasconcelos 2011; Hughes et al. 2017;
Spencer and Gomez 2011). In particular, given that institutions shape “the
rules of the game” (North 1990) for a society and its market structure, they
play an important role in explaining foreign subsidiary sources of value
and growth in foreign environments (Chung and Beamish 2005). Thus,
institutional arguments complement MBV and RBV perspectives and have
proven to be considerable insightful in unlocking the determinants of for-
eign subsidiary performance (Christmann et al. 1999; Peng et al. 2009).
Considering the above and building upon the inroads of institutional
theory, the purpose of this research is to study the impact of local institu-
tional context on the performance level of MNE foreign subsidiaries. In
order to test our research intention, we focus on Turkey, a country where
a statist polity environment traditionally exists, in combination with the
recent changes toward the establishment of a more liberal socio-economic
system (€Ozen and Akkemik 2012). The core theoretical and practical
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implication of our analysis is that host institutional quality is an influential
predictor of firm performance, and a majority of its dimensions, i.e. polit-
ical stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and the rule of
law increase subsidiaries’ performance. This finding corroborates prior
institutional-oriented subsidiary management studies, showing that apart
from resources and industry considerations, local institutions may have
determinant effects on subsidiary performance. In this regard, we add to
research positing the value of an institution-based theory in subsidiary the-
orizing (e.g. Dikova 2009; Goldszmidt, Brito, and de Vasconcelos 2011;
Konara and Shirodkar 2018; Spencer and Gomez 2011). At the second level
of analysis, we also contribute to institutional literature by providing per-
ceptual evaluations of governance quality on firm performance; as com-
pared to objective data reported in secondary databases used by most
researchers (e.g. Chao and Kumar 2010; Kottaridi, Giakoulas, and
Manolopoulos 2019; Ward, Yasar, and Maurisson 2010). Perceptual meas-
ures are particularly useful in institutional studies since these constructs are
difficult to quantify (Manolopoulos, Chatzopoulou, and Kottaridi 2018).
Finally, we present empirical evidence on the relationship between local
institutional quality and subsidiary performance from Turkey, a country
with a strong global presence in the world economy.
Theoretical background and research questions
The MBV of the firm, derived largely from the patterns of competition in
the United States in the 1970s (Peng et al. 2009), originates conceptually
from industrial organizational economics, and adopt an industry focus and
external market orientation to address value and firm profitability (Caves
and Porter 1978). Bain’s (1968) structure-conduct-performance (SCP) con-
tinuum and Porter’s (1980) five forces model are the main MBV theoretical
anchors which lay the (micro)foundations of a firm to achieve sustained
competitiveness and superior performance. According to these frameworks,
firm performance relates to the exploitation of a unique set of activities
that are different from its rivals and/or how an organization performs simi-
lar activities to other firms, but in very different ways (Makhija 2003).
Thus, performance is determined by the structure and competitive dynam-
ics of the industry within which a firm operates (Wang 2014, p. 34).
Privileged end-product market positions are the basis for superior perform-
ance for specific firms, compared to others that compete within the same
industry space (Makhija 2003, pp. 433). Within this perspective, MNE for-
eign subsidiaries operate in diverse competitive environments, have differ-
entiated market power, and achieve different performance levels
(Makhija 2003).
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In contrast, the RBV of the firm (Barney 1991; Wernerfelt 1984) shifted
from industry to firm-specific effects regarding sources of value, competi-
tive advantage, and performance (Spanos and Lioukas 2001). Its central
premise is that firms compete on the basis of their resources and capabil-
ities (Peteraf and Bergen 2003). RBV adopts two core assumptions in ana-
lyzing the relationship between sources of competitive advantage and
performance (Barney 1991). First, firms within an industry may be hetero-
geneous with respect to the bundle of resources they possess (Madhok, Li,
and Priem 2010). Second, since resources are imperfectly mobile across
firms, this resource heterogeneity may persist over time (Helfat and Peteraf
2003). In this vein, a (sustainable) competitive advantage leading to
advanced performance levels is provided by valuable, rare, and hard-to-imi-
tate firm-level resources and capabilities that competitors are unable to
reproduce (Prahalad and Hamel 1990). Along with the RBV perspective,
when competing in international markets, foreign subsidiaries may adopt
the MNE well-established resource endowments (e.g. organizational practi-
ces) for internal legitimacy (Hughes et al. 2017; Mellahi et al. 2013), or
develop new resources and capabilities (Lu and Xu 2006) which will boost
their further development (Birkinshaw and Hood 1998), and influence their
performance levels (Subramaniam and Watson 2006).
Both the MBV and RBV have introduced insightful considerations on
the importance of organizational resources, and market competition struc-
tural dynamics in shaping firms’ performance outcomes. However, being
largely focused on national settings, they have not paid adequate attention
to foreign contexts (Peng et al. 2009). In the contemporary business reality,
many firms operate in multiple market environments and, nowadays, inter-
national business literature has clearly established the relevance of diverse
country contextual conditions to performance studies (e.g. Beamish 1985;
Dunning 2009; Ghemawat 2003; Hawawini, Subramanian, and Verdin
2004; Makino and Delios 1996). Country contextual effects are classified as
either economic or institutional in nature (Goldszmidt, Brito, and de
Vasconcelos 2011). In the institutional part, when MNEs operate in differ-
ent markets, they face challenges in strategically locate their subsidiaries
and adapt to the diversity of institutions across countries and regions
(Jackson and Deeg 2008, pp. 540). In that sense, “institutions matter”, and
we now witness a growing interest within scholarly investigation to incorp-
orate and explore institutional arguments within the international business
research (e.g. Christmann et al. 1999; Dikova 2009; Ghemawat 2003;
Konara and Shirodkar 2018; Spencer and Gomez 2011; Hughes et al. 2017).
Within this literature, differences in national institutional environments
influence performance, as they affect industry structure, the construction of
firm’s resource base and the appropriation of the economic rents generated
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by them (Dunning and Lundan 2008; Michailova and Zhan 2015). Thus,
the capacity of subsidiaries to be effectively embedded within their local
institutional contexts may be indispensable to their success
(Hutzschenreuter, Kleindienst, and Lange 2014).
The institutional paradigm (North 1990; Oliver 1991; Scott 1991) com-
bines economic-oriented and sociological approaches to direct attention at
forces that lie beyond organizations and industry boundaries. The theory is
rooted back in the seventies; tracing its origins to the seminal work of
Meyer and Rowan (1977) which discussed the impact of external influences
on organizational development. According to the institutional standpoint,
firms co-evolve with their environment (Cantwell, Dunning, and Lundan
2010). Thus, organizational actions are seen not only as choices among
alternatives derived from firm-internal arrangements; but rather as choices
defined by a range of options determined by firms’ external environment
(Scott 1991). These external influences are manifested in institutions, which
may be broadly defined as the regulative, normative, and cognitive pillars
(Kostova 1997; Scott 1995) that guide individual and organiza-
tional behaviors.
Within international business, institutional perspectives see different
routes of inquiry on subsidiary performance. Previous research on the insti-
tutional dimensions-performance relationship has focused on the magni-
tude and direction of home-host institutional differences, emphasizing the
impact of institutional distance (e.g. Chao and Kumar 2010; He, Jianhong,
and Jinmeng 2015; Konara and Shirodkar 2018; Kostova 1999), recording
mixed empirical evidence (Konara and Shirodkar 2018). In general, institu-
tional distance, defined as “the extent of similarity or dissimilarity between
the regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions of two countries” (Xu
and Shenkar 2002, pp. 608), seems to reversely affect increased perform-
ance levels (e.g. Dow and Ferencikova 2010; Ghemawat 2001). Thus, sub-
sidiaries from similar institutional environments tend to outperform those
from distant institutional contexts. To rephrase this argument, MNE sub-
sidiaries are motivated to become more isomorphic with their institutional
environment in order to enhance their legitimacy and performance. Others
researchers though (e.g. Dikova 2009; Evans and Mavondo 2002) posit that
a larger institutional distance may increase performance because it moti-
vates firms to undertake more aggressive research for better strategic deci-
sion-making (Trapczynski and Banalieva 2016, pp. 826). Relevant
considerations in the institutional – subsidiary performance links addressed
more specifically the importance of the physical distance between the cen-
ter and the periphery of the network (Dikova 2009), and MNEs’ regional
experience (Dikova 2009; He, Jianhong, and Jinmeng 2015; Luo 2001).
Other researchers focused on institutional pressures to transfer practices
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and human capital development (Edwards and Kuruvilla 2005; Jensen and
Szulanski 2004), and the impact of institutional changes on firms’ profit-
ability and growth (Peng 2001). These areas of inquiry are often interre-
lated. For instance, some studies (e.g. Kostova 1999) have looked into
problems in the transfer of organizational knowledge and practices, due to
differences in institutional contexts determined by institutional distance.
With few exceptions (e.g. Tao et al. 2018), the quality of the local institu-
tional context per se in influencing subsidiary performance is much less
studied in international business research (Lynch and Jin 2016). This is
especially important for emerging and transition countries, that struggle to
find their way toward a market-based economy, posing important institu-
tional challenges to foreign firms. The institutional quality refers to the
degree of stability and development of the institutional infrastructure of
host countries, which includes the set of laws, regulations, administrative
procedures and policies formally sanctioned by the government (Cuervo-
Cazurra and Genc 2008). In this direction, Huther and Shah (1996, pp. 40)
linked the notion of institutional quality with governance quality, defining
the latter as “… all aspects of the exercise of authority through formal and
informal institutions in the management of the resource endowment of a
state.” Governance transcends the institutional framework, by encompass-
ing the interaction between formal and informal institutions, rules, and
relations (including for instance social norms and corruption perceptions).
Firm performance is affected by the governance quality prevailing in a
specific country (assuming in the main a positive association), since it is a
factor that directly influences its costs and competitive foundations. For
instance, Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff (2002) show that better prop-
erty rights institutions make firms’ more likely to reinvest their profits in
the business. In a similar vein, Ward, Yasar, and Maurisson (2010) find
that the protection of property rights is positively related to firm productiv-
ity. As said, broadly defined, governance quality refers to the process by
which public authority is exercised in the management of a country’s social
and economic resources; and the capacity of governments to achieve the
objectives they are supposed to address (World Bank 1994; 2000). In most
empirical investigations (e.g. Manolopoulos and Vavouras 2014; Rajkumar
and Swaroop 2009; Thomas 2010) governance quality is assessed through
the World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). WGI consist of
six composite indicators (or dimensions), i.e. voice and accountability, pol-
itical stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption; classified into three groups: (i) the process of govern-
ment selection, monitor and replacement, (ii) the capacity of governments
to formulate and execute sound policies, and (iii) the existing institutions
that govern citizens’ and the state mutual economic and social interactions
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(Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2003). The aim of these six indicators is
to evaluate the capacity of the public sector to implement policies that
influence the macroeconomic and microeconomic environment in a spe-
cific country.
Based on the aforementioned considerations, we formulate the following
research questions that serve as the direction for our empirical research:
Research Question 1. Is the host institutional context per se an influential predictor
of MNE foreign subsidiaries’ performance?




Following the tradition established in location studies (e.g. Alcacer 2006),
we test our predictions using a cross-sectional sample of foreign operations
located in Turkey. We argue that the specific setting provides an interesting
test case for our research purposes: in Turkey, the dominant developmental
state characteristic is rooted in Kemalism, the official ideology of the state
(€Ozen and Akkemik 2012, pp. 523). The “nationalism” principles of this
ideology, in particular, have assigned the state a central role in the national
economic development, formulated as “catching-up” with the “developed”
Western world (Eralp 1990). To achieve this objective, during the eighties
public policy in the country changed sharply from a state-oriented
approach toward market-based solutions. This shift has transformed the
local institutional context and created unique challenges for for-
eign investors.
The effects of liberalization policies that took place in the economic scen-
ery of the country have been revealed within two decades. According to
World Bank reports, Turkey’s performance to attract foreign investments
since 2000 has been impressive. During this time, Turkey opened up to for-
eign trade and finance, harmonized many laws and regulations with
European Union (EU) standards, and offered multiple incentives to foreign
firms. As a result, according to the global consultancy firm Ernst & Young,
in recent years the country has become the tenth most attractive foreign
direct investment destination in Europe. Between 2009 and 2013, the num-
ber of foreign projects in the focal economy increased by 129%. In 2015,
Turkish government agencies reported an increase of 32% in foreign invest-
ments. The increased quantity and considerable quality of investment
inflows in the country offers an ideal setting for our study, since it displays
trends and features that could also characterize other emerging economies
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(see for instance Brookfield 2010; Luo and Chung 2005). On the other
hand, significant political risks associated with investment and capital flows
create institutional challenges for ensuring investment security.
Sampling, data collection and survey instrument
We gleaned information for our sample from a comprehensive database of
foreign operations in the country over the period 2000 to 2013 provided by
the International Security Exchange (ISE) and the International Investors’
Association (YASED) directories; backed up from the Union of Chambers of
Commerce, Industry, Maritime Trade and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey
(TOBB). All the databases employed here are considered as authoritative
sources of information, providing complete coverage of company invest-
ments in Turkey and up-to-date, firm-level information on foreign activ-
ities. Our final sampling population included 857 inward foreign
investments. After accounting for responses with missing data, 104 ques-
tionnaires were gathered. The response rate (12.13%) seems adequate for
international business, organizational theory and strategic management
empirical literature and does not constitute a study limitation. The number
of respondents for EU MNEs, U.S. and MNEs from the rest of the world
(mainly Asia) were 46 (44.2%), 22 (21.2%) and 36 (34.6%), respectively.
Among these 104 foreign operations, 38 (36.54%) are classified in the man-
ufacturing sector and 66 (63.46%) as services’ industries. 49 (47.11%) out
of them are wholly owned subsidiaries (WOS), while 55 (52.89%) have
been formed through an international joint venture (IJV). The average
years of subsidiaries’ operation in the focal market is 20.55 years (std.
dev¼ 20.61). 12.5% of the responding firms had 10 or less employees
(micro subsidiaries), 20.19% had between 11 and 50 employees (small sub-
sidiaries), 18.27% were medium-sized enterprises (between 51 and 250
employees), and 49.04% were large subsidiaries (over 250 employees).
According to this distribution of surveyed firms, it is reasonable to assume
that our sample seems to be skewed toward larger firms and this possible
bias should be kept in mind when interpreting the results. The possibility
of non-response bias was checked by comparing the characteristics of the
respondents with those of the original population sample. The calculated t-
statistics for independence for country of origin and subsidiary age were
statistically insignificant; suggesting that our sample does not suffer from
non-response bias.
Data for this study were collected through a combination of question-
naire responses and secondary sources. The following two steps guided the
development of our survey instrument: (i) a review of extant literature to
identify measures that would appropriately capture our core explanatory
8 D. MANOLOPOULOS ET AL.
constructs under investigation, and (ii) interviews with five subsidiary cor-
porate-level executives to understand and clarify the phenomena of interest.
A draft questionnaire was developed which was pretested with experts in
the field and yield the final version of our survey instrument. A personal-
ized cover letter accompanying each questionnaire explained the purpose of
the study and provided assurances regarding anonymity and confidentiality.
This approach encourages respondents to answer honestly and reduces the
potential for modifying their responses due to social desirability bias.
Our questionnaire was addressed to subsidiaries’ top managers (see
Bingham and Haleblian 2012, for a definition). Conceptually, top managers
satisfy two accepted criteria for their identification as appropriate key
respondents: (a) possession of sufficient knowledge of subsidiary strategies




Our dependent variable was subsidiary performance (PERF); measured as
the annual turnover of the firm (in $US million). In general, financial indi-
cators are favorable constructs for evaluating firm performance (e.g. Lu and
Beamish 2001; Manolopoulos 2018) and annual turnover is frequently
regarded as a key indicator of firm success. In order to sort the perform-
ance levels of subsidiaries, a four-point Likert-type scale was prepared,
where the scale value “4” indicates an annual turnover over $US 50 million,
“3” between $US 11 and $US 50 million, “2” between $US10 and $US 1
million, and the scale value “1” indicates an annual turnover of the firm
less than $US 1 million.
Independent variables
Most of the study’s (five out of six) institutional constructs were captured
through multiple questionnaire items. Respondents evaluated each item
reflecting their perceptions of governance quality (QoG) on one-to-five-
point Likert-type scales. The dimensions of QoG are operationalized in
Table 1.
Controls
We have included in our analysis a number of organizational controls that
prior research has shown as affecting firm performance. Entry mode deci-
sions impact on the range of strategic options available to the subsidiary
(Brouthers and Hennart 2007) and, consequently, to its financial
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performance (Shaver 1998). Here, subsidiaries’ mode of entry (MoE) was
captured by a dummy 0-1 variable that equals 1 if the subsidiary has
entered the local market via a WOS (drawn from Manolopoulos 2014).
Subsidiaries’ country of origin (ORIGIN) (a dummy variable, where 1¼EU
MNE and 0¼MNE outside EU) is also associated with their performance
(Noorderhaven and Harzing 2003). Finally, following Hughes et al. (2017),
subsidiary age, size and sector of activity were selected as control variables
as each can affect performance levels. Sector of activity (SECT) is captured
with another dummy variable (1¼manufacturing, 0¼ services). Subsidiary
size (SIZE) was measured using a four-point Likert-type scale
(1¼ subsidiaries with less than 11 employees, 2¼ subsidiaries that employ
between 11 and 50 employees, 3¼ subsidiaries that employ between 51 and
250 employees and 4¼ subsidiaries with more than 250 employees).
Finally, years of operation (YoP) indicate the number of years the subsid-
iary has been established in the local market.
Validation and psychometric properties of the measurement scales
A consideration of the research was the minimization of common method
concerns. To correct for such effects, the following precautions were taken:
first, our dependent variable was measured using secondary data, whereas
our core independent variables were measured in the questionnaire by the
use of perceptual evaluations. Further, a number of controls (e.g. size, years
of operation and country of origin) are archival, obviating any danger of
common method bias with them (Manolopoulos, Chatzopoulou, and
Kottaridi 2018). This diversity in the data sources reduces the likelihood of
common method bias. In addition, scale anchors were reversed in specific
items of the questionnaire to reduce and compensate for the development
of response patterns. These precautions afford some confidence that any
potential bias coming from our approach is likely to be minor.
The psychometric properties of our measurement scales were evaluated
by the following accepted practices in the literature: to assess the validity
and reliability of our measures, we employed confirmatory factor analysis
(CFA) to test whether our multi-item measures are associated with their
respective constructs. During this process, each item was restricted to load
on a priori specified factor, while allowing the underlying factors to correl-
ate (Manolopoulos, Chatzopoulou, and Kottaridi 2018). Our baseline meas-
urement model yielded a good fit to the data: chi-square (v)¼ 99.17,
p¼.005; comparative fit index (CFI)¼ 0.922; root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA)¼ 0.044 and standardized root mean square
residual (SRMR)¼0.057. Also, all items load highly to their corresponding
factor, providing thus evidence of the uni-dimensionality of our constructs
JOURNAL OF EAST-WEST BUSINESS 11
(Anderson and Gerbing 1988). Except for discriminatory tariffs (which
nevertheless is higher than 0.4), the values of all the remaining factor load-
ings are higher than that of 0.6. Further, the composite reliability was very
satisfactory since it was above the 0.70 cutoff point for our constructs,
while the same also applies to the Cronbach’s alphas. Consequently, a large
number of measures are free of random errors. These findings provide evi-
dence for the convergent validity of our regressors.
Results and discussion of findings
Analysis of results
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations and pairwise Pearson corre-
lations between our dependent variable and all the regressors used in this
study. All bivariate correlations are below the 0.70 threshold level and no
high correlations have been reported (two-tailed p). Further, since most of
the correlations between the core exploratory and control variables are
moderate to low and the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are well below
the recommended by Allison (1999) threshold of 2.5 (mean VIF ¼ 1.22),
multicollinearity does not seem to be a serious concern to our analysis.
Since subsidiary performance takes one of four values for each perform-
ance level, it corresponds to a specific range, being at the same time ordinal
in nature. In this case, ordered probit (OP) analysis is the econometrically
preferred specification to capture the ordinal ranking of our dependent
variable. Before presenting regression results, the validity of our model has
been assessed. Regression diagnostics are portrayed in Figure 1. From the
graph, it can be inferred that our model satisfies the assumptions of linear-
ity, normality and homogeneity of variance. Also, our models return high
levels of chi-square values rejecting the null hypothesis of model misspecifi-
cation at the 0.01 percent level.
Our regression results are displayed in Table 3. We first estimated a
baseline model (Model 1), reporting only the results of the controls (organ-
izational demographics) on the dependent variable. Next, we introduced
the terms testing the impact of governance quality dimensions on subsid-
iary performance (Model 2). Model 2 represents an improvement over the
respective baseline model (R-squaredmodel2: 0.152, R-squaredmodel1:0.090),
indicating the explanatory power of local governance quality in the per-
formance measure. Before discussing the impact of institutional constructs
on foreign subsidiaries’ performance, it should be noted that in both our
specifications (Models 1 and 2), among all the control variables under
investigation, only subsidiary size was found to be constantly and signifi-
cantly positively related to the performance variable (p<.001). This finding
contradicts evidence developed in the literature suggesting a negative
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relationship between size and firm performance (e.g. Lu and Beamish
2001). Surprisingly enough, despite scholarly evidence for the opposite case
(e.g. Brouthers, Brouthers, and Werner 2008; He, Brouthers, and
Filatotchev 2013), in our study subsidiaries’ mode of entry is not associated
with their performance outcomes. The same applies to country of origin,
years of operation and sector of activity.
Coming back to our hypothesized predictions, our first research question
attempts to evaluate the impact of local institutional quality on subsidiary
performance. Model 2 provides support for the positive and statistical sig-
nificant association between most of the quality of governance indicators
with increased subsidiary performance levels. Therefore, it can be sup-
ported that the quality of host governance enables foreign subsidiaries to
increase their performance and that MNE operations in environments char-
acterized by well-developed institutions have gains accrued at the subsidiary
level (Wu et al. 2016). We then hypothesize that in host countries charac-
terized by a strong institutional context, subsidiaries capitalize on institu-
tional advantages to develop their resources and capabilities. This may
enhance their potential to stake a claim for advanced competitiveness in
the wider MNE network (Cuervo-Cazurra 2008; Luo and Tung 2007).
Our second research question attempts to identify the effects of local
governance quality dimensions on subsidiary performance. According to







































Figure 1. Regression diagnostics.
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political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and rule of
law has been recorded (at the .001, .05, .05, and .01 levels of significance
respectively). Our findings are in line with the work of Manolopoulos,
Chatzopoulou, and Kottaridi (2018), indicating that the capacity of govern-
ments to formulate and execute sound policies reduces agency and transac-
tion costs, help firms overcome information asymmetries and promote
entrepreneurial performance. Further, we corroborate Maskus (2000), who
has argued that well-defined and transparent laws encourage investments
and improve performance. Finally, the stability of the political environment
seems to reduce uncertainty and secure the profitability initiatives of firms
(Schneider and Frey 1985; Rodrik 1991). These findings, in the main,
reaffirm the importance of local governance quality for MNE subsidiaries’
competitiveness, value, and profitability.
Discussion of findings
The main findings to us seem to be the following: first, the role of country
conditions in determining subsidiary outcomes seems to be particularly














Rule of lawa 0.330
(0.153)
Control of corruptiona 0.046
(0.095)




















LR chi-square 22.42 35.36
Prob> chi-square 0.0004 0.0002
Pseudo R square 0.0902 0.1523
Log pseudo-likelihood 1,13,032 1,24,240
Notes:significant at 0.05, significant at 0.01, significant at 0.001.
aEntrepreneurial perceptions.
bRobust standard errors in parentheses.
N¼104.
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important. Lending support to the work of Christmann, Day, and Yip
(1999), positing that country conditions affect the business climate for
MNE subsidiaries operating in a particular country, here we claim that the
quality of governance, as a country conditional factor, influence signifi-
cantly subsidiaries’ performance. This result is in line with the works of
Khanna and Palepu (1997) and North (1990), arguing that well-developed
institutions reduce uncertainty and lower transaction and search costs,
boosting in that way firm performance. Second, extant research provides
conflicting evidence about whether MNEs can benefit from the geograph-
ical dispersion of their subsidiaries (Hitt, Hoskisson, and Kim 1997; Wu
et al. 2016). Here we argue that MNEs’ expansion in countries with strong
institutional contexts has positive competitive and performance implica-
tions for their foreign subsidiaries. This may be attributed to the fact that a
well-functioning local institutional environment may advance subsidiaries’
performance by allowing access to efficient factors of production, reducing
uncertainty and associated costs. We thus extend prior theorizing by pro-
posing that the positive effects of internationalization on firm performance
can be explained not only by the one-way transfer of parent resources and
capabilities to their geographically dispersed subunits but also by the host
country level of institutional quality (Wu et al. 2016). In this regard, insti-
tutional development and associated market reforms may lead subsidiaries
to a reduced reliance from MNE-internal capabilities, drive them to
develop distinctive competitive advantages and claim a more value-added
role within MNE network operations. Thus, we add to environmental
determinism theory (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Hannan and Freeman
1989) which argues that firm outcomes are mainly determined by factors
that are not controllable by its management. Third, we argue that the local
institutional context cannot be treated as a unidimensional construct by
international business researchers. Our findings indicate that subsidiaries
do not perceive that all six dimensions describing QoG prevailing in a
country as being of equal importance, as far as their direct impact on their
cost functions and generated revenues is concerned. Finally, we stress the
relevance of political stability as the most important feature of governance
quality that influences positively firm performance. An unstable political
situation and associated risks seem to adversely affect the performance of
firms operating within the country, making it more difficult to keep reve-
nues growing as fast as costs. It has been also revealed that regulatory insti-
tutions are very influential in determining subsidiaries’ elements of
competitiveness. There are clear implications of this study for MNE manag-
ers and policymakers. The determinant effect of country conditions on sub-
sidiary performance suggests that MNE managers should very carefully
scrutinize and evaluate the quality of governance in the markets they
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intend to enter. This strategic choice will lead the multinational organiza-
tions to significant competitive advantages and maximize the value-addition
of their investments. Further, since our analysis relates subsidiaries’ per-
formance with the institutional context they operate, our findings show
how subsidiary managers could manage their internal operations in exter-
nal institutional settings. Finally, the importance of the QoG in determin-
ing subsidiary performance suggests that a critical skill for MNE
management is to hedge efficiently against the exposure of their subsidia-
ries to political instability, regulatory burdens and government ineffective-
ness in the markets they operate (Lynch and Jin 2016). Policymakers, on
the other hand, should ensure the QoG within their countries so as to
attract more quantitative and qualitative investment inflows.
Conclusions and limitations
In this paper, we analyze the relationship between host institutional quality
and MNE foreign subsidiaries’ performance. There are currently two highly
differing theories in the literature, i.e. the MBV and RBV of the firm, to
explain why some firms perform in a superior manner and are associated
with higher value than others. Yet, with some notable exceptions (see for
instance Lecraw (1983) and Douglas and Craig (1983) for the MBV model
and Fang et al. (2007), and Fey and Bjorkman (2001) for the RBV), these
theoretical perspectives clearly point to different sources of competitive
advantage and tend to under-research the performance determinants of
MNE foreign subsidiaries. Our research extends, to consider the important
role played by institutional forces, which MBV and RBV studies have not
fully addressed. According to our results, subsidiary performance seems to
be positively influenced by institutional effectiveness. In this way, we com-
plement the arguments developed by the burgeoning body of RBV and
MBV research, positing that it is not only the transfer of MNE intangible
assets and capabilities, or a favorable and unbiased industry structure that
promote subsidiary growth, but also the high quality of local government
institutions that exercise and implement laws and policies. Among all insti-
tutional dimensions, political stability, regulatory quality, government
effectiveness, and rule of law emerge as the most influential predictors of
subsidiary competitiveness.
This work contributes to the literature in two main ways: first, it adds to
research that develop institutional theory in the international market place
(e.g. Brouthers and Brouthers 2000; Xu and Shenkar 2002). In particular,
we focus on the “performance consequences” role of institutional constructs
in MNE subsidiary operations (e.g. Dikova 2009; Hughes et al. 2017;
Kafouros and Aliyev 2016). In this regard, we respond to calls for more
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integrated research investigating the determinants of subsidiaries’ growth.
Second, we deviate from the extensively studied concepts of institutional
pressures and institutional distance in international business studies, and
focus on the quality of governance as an indicator of institutional effective-
ness. By using WGI, we empirically show that different dimensions of gov-
ernance have a differentiated impact, both in magnitude and scale on
foreign subsidiaries’ performance.
Limitations of the study
As with every empirical study, our results are subject to a series of caveats.
Five of them are reported here: first, and maybe most important, we did not
consider the influences of the industry structure or MNE resources and
resource heterogeneity in examining the proposed relationships. Yet, there is
strong evidence to support that firm performance is determined by a range
of firm-level and competition-based factors (Barney 1991; Porter 1980).
Second, while there are several constructs measuring institutional context,
such as the economic freedom index (Estrin et al. 2008), here we focus on
governance quality. The consideration of other institutional measures would
provide us with additional insights on the impact of local institutions on
subsidiary performance. Further, our results should be viewed in light of the
single-country research context. We focus our research in Turkey, and this
may limit the generalizability of our findings. Countries have different eco-
nomic and political conditions; therefore, a replication of the study in mul-
tiple country environments would provide us with more consistent results.
In addition, in our sample almost half of subsidiaries under investigation are
large enterprises. A more equivalent distribution of the sampled firms would
provide us with additional insights on the relationship between institutional
quality and performance of medium-sized and smaller firms. Finally, the use
of a single performance indicator for measuring performance is also consid-
ered a limitation of this study, hindering its generalizability.
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